Modern science achieved objectivity by removing subjectivity from theory.
Observers were treated as coordinate systems, and physical reality was assumed to exist independently of them.
This worked well for classical physics.
But quantum mechanics introduced a strange situation: measurement determines physical outcomes, yet the observing subject itself is never defined within the theory.
The observer is necessary, but structurally absent.
This raises a deeper question.
Modern knowledge is built on the subject–object distinction. But if the observing subject is excluded from theory, can a theory of observation actually be complete?
Maybe the “observer problem” in physics is not just a technical issue, but a structural consequence of removing subjectivity from the foundations of knowledge.
Modern science achieved objectivity by removing subjectivity from theory.
Yes, because the whole point of the material sciences is to describe reality as it exists independently of the subject.
Observers were treated as coordinate systems
Coordinate systems are more fundamental than observers. In Minkowski space, you can define a reference frame where an observer isn’t even present, in fact, you can even define a reference frame where no object is present at all.
Observers perceive different things in different physical contexts not because they are observers, but because they occupy different contexts. The physical context under which an observation takes place is more fundamental than the observer themselves.
and physical reality was assumed to exist independently of them.
Obviously the observer exists in physical reality. The point is not that materialists are pretending the observer doesn’t exist in physical reality, but that the conscious observer is not a fundamental feature of objective reality, and the things which they observe can be explained from pre-existing features in reality that would evolve in their own way even if the observer was not there to observe them.
But quantum mechanics introduced a strange situation: measurement determines physical outcomes, yet the observing subject itself is never defined within the theory.
Modern physicists tend to be highly pragmatic, prioritizing simplicity in their mathematics so it can be effectively used for calculations, engineering, and problem-solving, rather than worrying about philosophical questions.
If your goal is to strip away as many mathematical complexities as possible from predictive models due to pragmatic reasons, it’s easy to end up removing objective reality itself from the mathematics, creating a theory that only describes what appears on measurement devices and nothing beyond that.
The current formalism of quantum mechanics reflects this extreme pragmatism. Some academics, encountering this formalism, then slide into quantum mysticism, claiming that objective reality doesn’t exist until it’s observed, because the formalism doesn’t explicitly include it. But this is circular reasoning: the choice of formalism used to derive our ontology from requires justification. You cannot conclude that reality doesn’t exist simply because the formalism omits it; you must first justify why that particular formalism is the foundation for ontological claims.
In fact, it is entirely possible to construct quantum mechanical formalisms that do include objective reality. For instance, the physicist David Bohm developed a model of non-relativistic quantum predictions using point particles moving deterministically in 3D space, with well-defined positions at all times, independent of observation. The physicist Hrvoje Nikolić showed that this can indeed be extended to the relativistic domain as well.
This approach is less popular because it is mathematically more cumbersome. Most physicists favor the simpler, more pragmatic formalism that makes calculations easier. But the argument “objective reality is absent from the simplified formalism, therefore it doesn’t exist” is invalid. Any ontological conclusion requires an independent justification for why the simplified formalism should dictate our understanding of reality.
The observer is necessary
Under some formulations of the theory.
Thank you for the detailed explanation. I largely agree with your criticism of quantum mysticism.
However, the point I’m interested in is slightly different.
In quantum mechanics, the time evolution of the state is very precisely defined. But why a single outcome is selected from many possible outcomes during measurement does not seem to be clearly defined within the theory itself.
So the issue, at least for me, is not “whether the observer creates reality,” but rather “why that particular outcome is selected.”
And it seems to me that this point is not fully resolved even within the explanation based on the physical context you mentioned.
The research I shared attempts to address this by defining the conditions under which a single outcome is selected, not in terms of the psychology of an observer, but as a subjectivity structure.
Also, regarding a point you mentioned earlier: it is true that Satoru Watanabe does not belong to an independent research institute, and many of the papers posted on ResearchGate may not have undergone peer review.
However, his work has been recognized by researchers in the field, including Stuart Hameroff, and there are ongoing efforts to publish it in academic journals. He was also formally invited to present at the international conference TSC (Toward a Science of Consciousness) scheduled to be held in Arizona, although that particular conference was unfortunately cancelled due to the Epstein-related issues.
So the issue, at least for me, is not “whether the observer creates reality,” but rather “why that particular outcome is selected.”
That’s just Laplacian determinism. It’s not a physical issue. Maybe the universe is just random? Physics has no issue describing randomness in the language of mathematics. It is a physical issue if the model has a particular contradiction or inconsistency, but this is not a contradiction or inconsistency, it is just a dislike of nondeterminism.
But if you really dislike nondeterminism. well, Louis de Broglie showed you can fit quantum mechanics to a deterministic model a century ago back at the 1927 Solvay conference. It’s called de Broglie - Bohm theory. It makes all the same predictions as quantum mechanics but is absolutely deterministic where the outcome of a quantum experiment is solely determined by the precise initial position of the particles involved. Why a particular outcome is selected is then not random but specifically due to the precise initial positions of the particles.
Also, Hameroff is also a mystic nutcase. You need to get out of the loony bin and come back to reality.
If Bohmian mechanics really solves the measurement problem, where in the theory is the Born rule (ρ = |ψ|²) actually derived, rather than assumed?
Also, regarding your point that this is “outside of physics”:
I think that is true within the framework of existing physics, from Newton through Einstein, where outcome selection is not treated as part of the internal structure of the theory.
However, the work by Satoru Watanabe is precisely attempting to address this gap — not by appealing to mysticism, but by proposing a framework in which what has traditionally been placed outside of physics can be incorporated into its internal structure in a consistent way.
In that sense, it suggests something closer to a Copernican shift: not rejecting physics, but extending what counts as part of its formal structure.
ψ is not necessary in the formulation of Bohmian mechanics. You can formulate it without it since the quantum potential Q only has partial dependence upon ψ.
But I don’t even see how it’s relevant even if ψ is assumed. I don’t think you have any idea what the measurement problem is. The measurement problem is not that “we assume things.” All mathematical models in the entirety of human history assume something. If you replace the current model with a more fundamental model, that more fundamental model will also assume things. Having assumptions is not the problem. The assumptions being coherent is the problem.
I am beginning to suspect that “Laura” is not even real and that you are Satoru Watanabe.
Thank you for your detailed comment.
I agree that all physical theories necessarily involve some assumptions, and that what ultimately matters is their coherence.
However, the point I am raising is not about whether assumptions exist, but about something more structural.
In quantum mechanics, the time evolution of the state is clearly defined, but how that mathematical state connects to a single observed outcome does not seem to be explicitly defined within the theory itself.
In other words,
under what conditions a single outcome becomes actualized from multiple possibilities
is the issue I am pointing to.
This is not simply a question of determinism vs. indeterminism, nor about whether assumptions are present, but rather about how the mapping from state to outcome is defined within the theory.
And it seems that even in Bohmian mechanics, this ultimately depends on initial conditions or distributions (such as those corresponding to the Born rule), whose origin is not fully derived within the theory itself.
The research I shared is an attempt to address this not by introducing additional assumptions, but by defining this part as a coherence condition within the structure of the theory.
In other words, the focus is not on reducing assumptions, but on defining the conditions under which an outcome becomes actual as part of the internal structure of the theory itself.
In that sense, I think your emphasis on coherence is actually quite close to the core of the issue being addressed.
And just to clarify one point: I am not Satoru Watanabe.
In quantum mechanics, the time evolution of the state is clearly defined, but how that mathematical state connects to a single observed outcome does not seem to be explicitly defined within the theory itself.
Again, you are just asking for Laplacian determinism. I don’t have any issues with randomness. That’s just your personal problem. And, again, if it bothers you that much, there are deterministic models out there, like de Broglie - Bohm theory, where particles have definite positions at all times that evolve deterministically according to the quantum Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and you measure the particle at the location you find it because it evolves there deterministically.
This is not simply a question of determinism vs. indeterminism,
It objectively is. You cannot complain about nondeterminism and turn around and say it has nothing to do with nondeterminism. Your problem is clearly the nondeterminism as you constantly repeat that you dislike that there lacks a reason for one value to be selected over another from the probability distribution. That is, by definition, a complaint about nondeterminism.
but rather about how the mapping from state to outcome is defined within the theory.
In standard quantum mechanics it is, again, just random.
And it seems that even in Bohmian mechanics, this ultimately depends on initial conditions or distributions (such as those corresponding to the Born rule), whose origin is not fully derived within the theory itself.
What on earth does that even mean? If I fire a cannonball from point X and it lands at point Y, and Newtonian mechanics predicts the full deterministic trajectory that would lead it to land at Y given it started at X, would you also respond saying that in Newtonian mechanics the origins of objects is “not fully derived”? What does that even mean?
Bohmian mechanics is very Newtonian esque. The particles just follow well-defined trajectories that are completely determined by their initial conditions. If a photon leaves a photon emitter at location X and later shows up at location Y, it was absolutely determined to show up at Y given its location at X, and the trajectory between X and Y in 3D space is also well-defined.
And just to clarify one point: I am not Satoru Watanabe.
Sure.
By the way, how do you understand the concept of “God” in this context?
The reason I ask is that, in the work I mentioned, Watanabe argues that by excluding “God” — understood not theologically, but as a structural grounding of the relation between subject and object — modern physics has struggled for over a century to reconcile relativity and quantum mechanics in a fully coherent way.
I’m curious how you would interpret that claim from your perspective.
Observer in quantum mechanics is just a measuring tool, not a conscious being. In the double-slit experiment the observer is the detector, not a physicist. There is no need for subjectivity here.
I agree that in standard quantum mechanics the “observer” is treated as a measuring device, not a conscious subject.
But that’s exactly where the question begins.
A detector can register outcomes, but it doesn’t explain what it means for an outcome to be definite rather than a superposition.
Replacing the observer with a device avoids consciousness, but it doesn’t actually solve the measurement problem — it just shifts it.
We still have to ask: why does a specific result appear at all?
So the issue isn’t whether the observer is a human or a detector.
The issue is that the structure that makes observation possible is never defined inside the theory.
There is no need for the detector to explain anything. The very process of measurement collapses the wavefunction like most of interactions do. Measurement is not special, it collapses the wavefunction simply because you have to interact with particle to measure its properties. Observation is just a convenient word, which tends to muddy the understanding of laypeople.
I agree that interaction and decoherence explain why interference disappears.
But decoherence alone doesn’t explain why a single definite outcome appears. It turns a pure state into an apparent mixture, but it doesn’t select one result.
So the question remains: why do we observe one specific outcome rather than a mixture?
This is where I think the issue becomes structural rather than technical.
In standard frameworks, both the measuring device and the system are described, but the structure that makes “observation itself” possible is never defined inside the theory.
Some recent approaches try to treat this not as a missing variable, but as a missing layer of structure — where observation is not just interaction, but a generative condition for outcomes.
From that perspective, decoherence explains part of the process, but not the full mechanism of how a definite result comes into existence.
Isn’t this like the whole discussion about interpretations of quantum mechanics with probabilistic interpretations vs many-worlds interpretations vs “shut-up-and-calculate” “interpretation”?
I agree — even when we shift the “observer” to a device instead of a human, the problem doesn’t really disappear. It often just turns into a kind of regress.
So I’ve been wondering whether this could be approached from a different layer altogether.
Instead of choosing between interpretations, what if the issue is in the structure that all of them assume?
I came across a paper that tries to address this from that perspective.
If you’re interested, I’d really appreciate hearing your thoughts on it.
I’ll be honest, sounds like useless bullshit with zero actual applications.
There is actually a paper that tries to approach this experimentally, not just philosophically.
It proposes something called “subjectivity intersection,” where observation is treated as a structural interaction rather than just a measurement.
The interesting part is that some results suggest nonlocal correlations that can’t be reduced to standard causal interaction.
If that holds, it would mean observation isn’t just a local physical process, but something more relational in structure.
I’m not saying it’s proven — but it’s an attempt to move the discussion beyond interpretation and into testable structure.
