SELinux provides a strong security measure that can make an SELinux-enabled operating system a type of “fortress”: the so-called “confined users” [1] [2] [3], which add security and isolation capabilities that are in several respects comparable to containers but without many of their restrictions in GUI use cases (this topic is focused on desktop use cases, not server, infra, and such). By default, SELinux does not enforce much within user accounts but only around them. But in graphical desktop...
The "many eyes" theory is dead since the NSA backdoor in OpenSSL clearly showed how delusional that belief is. SELinux has never been audited by any trustworthy truly US-independent entity, making it nearly as untrustworthy as closed source. On top of that, there is always The Underhanded C Contest, proving that looking at the source is not enough. You need to be an expert who can detect underhanded backdoors too. – Evi1M4chine Feb 3, 2018 at 13:05
It was written by the NSA, that's enough for me not to trust SELinux.
It's open source and lots of eyeballs have looked at it.
It's fine.
Really good points from here:
Maybe but there must be a reason 99% of distributions use AppArmor instead
AppArmor is less complicated. That's the main reason
A backdoor written by NSA was literally found last month
Source?